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A. LEO LEviNt
Owen J. Roberts was dean of this law school when I joined the
faculty in 1949. It was he who extended the offer to me to come to
Penn, and for this I remain very grateful.
The vivid memories I have of Justice Roberts are from the
period that followed. He was an imposing figure in the history of
this school, but one tends to remember the little things. Once when
a number of us were at his home, Mrs. Roberts was showing us
around. When we came to the Justice's study someone remarked
that it was a very simple room, certainly furnished simply. Mrs.
Roberts, with evident pride and satisfaction, said: "The Justice is a
simple man."
Unpretentious is perhaps a better word, and it showed in his
deaning. As a very junior member of the faculty I particularly
appreciated the fact that the Justice reached out to all of us. There
were informal conversations on a wide variety of subjects, from
international affairs to innovative techniques in legal education, and
sometimes, when they served to illustrate a point, even reminiscen-
ces of his own experience as a trial lawyer.
This made for a collegial faculty, and that collegiality is very
much in evidence today. Justice Roberts is rightly credited with
many achievements that influenced this law school during a crucial
period in its history. I mention this one seemingly less important
aspect of his deanship because these remarks have profited
enormously from that spirit of collegiality as practiced today.
* This paper is adapted from the Owen J. Roberts Lecture delivered in
October, 1989.
t Leon Meltzer Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I am particularly indebted to my colleague Professor Stephen B. Burbank
who gave unstintingly of his time, his wisdom, and his expertise from the inception
of the project to its completion. Of the many others to whom I owe a debt of
gratitude I mention only my former colleague Russell R. Wheeler of the Federal
Judicial Center and my able research assistant Steven Spielvogel of the Class of 1992.
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I. LOCAL RULES AND DISUNIFORMITY
A. A "Gross Affliction"
The fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
in 1988, was marked with celebrations, felicitations, and toasts, but
also with agendas for change and, as might be expected, divergent
viewpoints.1 My focus, however, is not on the national rules, but
on local rules, the rules that pursuant to Rule 83 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure2 a majority of the judges of any district
may promulgate, to bind themselves and those who practice before
them.
Important segments of the bar are most unhappy with Rule 83
and the plethora of local rules that have evolved pursuant to its
authority. Like a "computer virus of indeterminate origin" they
have introduced "disuniformity and complications into the proce-
dural order."3 This is the assessment of Janet Napolitano, chair of
1 For a list of celebrations and citations to symposia, see Subrin, Preface to
Symposium, The 50th Anniversay of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1873 n.1 (1989). For a toast originally offered circa 1938, see Pepper,
The Advisor's Lamen4 reprinted in 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1877 (1989), and for a more
recent toast see Kaplan, A Toast 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (1989).
For reference to the Northeastern University School of Law Conference as the
opportunity to "shape and nurture the next fiftyyears of American civil practice," see
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to
Justice Being Raised, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1905 (1989); Frank, The Rules of Civil
Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1883 (1989).
It is interesting to note that in 1929, almost a decade before the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure became effective, OwenJ. Roberts had advocated "a very broad
rulemaking power." For a discussion of his views as expressed in Roberts, Trial
Procedure-Past Present and Future, 15 A.B.A.J. 667,668 (1929), see Burbank, TheRules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1031 n.65 (1982).
2As amended in 1985, Rule 83 provides:
RULES BY DISTRICT COURTS:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to
comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date
specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless amended by
the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any
district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial
council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be
made available to the public. In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
3 Napolitano, A Comment on Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
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the Local Rules Subcommittee of the Arizona State Bar Civil
Practice and Procedure Committee. John Frank characterizes local
rules as a "gross affliction," a "plague,"4 while Professor Subrin,
somewhat more restrained, at least in his imagery, refers to local
rules as "Wild Flowers in the Garden."
5
What is it about local rules that has engendered such intense
opposition? In exploring this question it is useful to begin with the
major premise that governs their promulgation and their validity:
consistency with the national rules. Rule 83 is specific in requiring
it; 6 the statute mandates no less.
7
That the power to promulgate local rules was limited to those
"not inconsistent" with the national rules should occasion no
surprise. A major purpose of the national rules was to achieve
uniformity among federal district courts wherever located.8
Unfettered authority to replace the national rules with whatever a
majority of judges in any given district preferred is contrary to the
central purpose of the entire enterprise. Local rules were a
concession to the fact that local conditions might make absolute
uniformity either impossible or undesirable, but these local
variations, the accommodations to local desires, were to operate in
the interstices, providing a little "play in the joints," without
significant impact on the national scheme.
The requirement of consistency has, however, been honored in
the breach. The Local Rules Project commissioned by the Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2063 (1989).
4 Frank, supra note 1, at 1898.
5 Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2011 (1989).
Metaphors for local rules have been around for a long time. See, e.g., HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES ENABLING AcT OF 1985, H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 n.55 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 422] (quoting 1967
testimony of Professor Maurice Rosenberg characterizing local rules as a "kind of
procedural Tower of Babel").
6 The text is quoted supra note 2.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988), which governs rule-making by "all courts
established by Act of Congress," and requires that "[s]uch rules shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section
2072 of this title," i.e. the national rules.
' For a rich discussion of uniformity between state and federal courts sitting in the
same state, and uniformity more generally, see Subrin, supra note 5. See also Keeton,
The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 853,
874 (1989) (providing a useful summary of reasons for local rules); id. at 860-62
(providing an insightful treatment of "National Uniformity and Local Autonomy").
1569
1570 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1567
the United States identified well over 800 instances of what it
diplomatically categorized as "possible inconsistency" with federal
rules or federal law. Add to that the sheer volume of local rules
with which counsel must become familiar and with which they must
comply,10 and one can understand the frequency and stridency of
complaint.
That volume should not be underestimated. Reference to the
millions of words contained in thousands upon thousands of local
rules is not a figure of speech. The Local Rules Project identified
over 5,000 local rules and one can understand the characterization
of the result as cacophony rather than uniformity." Professor
Subrin aptly put it this way: "This crack in the wall of uniformity
has become a gaping hole."
12
The picture cannot be considered complete, at least not in terms
of assessing uniformity from the point of view of a lawyer who
appears before a substantial number of federal judges with some
regularity, without a word about standing orders of individual
judges. Allow me to cite two examples, taken from the published
literature, in each case describing the practice of a distinguished,
9 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 2023. The Report of the Local Rules Project forwarded
to all ChiefJudges of the district courts in April 1989 byJudgeJoseph F. Weis, Jr.,
Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, did in fact identify
hundreds of local rules as actually inconsistent with existing law. See COMMIrrEE ON
RULES PRACTICE & PROC. OF THEJUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL
RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1989) [hereinafter LOCAL RULES
PROJECT].
Determining precisely what does and what does not constitute inconsistency is
frequently complex. Se4 e.g., Kecton, supra note 8 (favoring a standard far less strict
than that of the Project).
Some inconsistency appears rather picayune: a requirement that the demand for
jury trial be on a separate sheet of paper rather than merely endorsed on the
complaint. This is not to say that the procedure mandated by local rule may not be
a boon to the particular clerk's office and a burden to the attorney who has to
become familiar with the details of local requirements. Sometimes, however, an
added requirement that the summons be filed with the complaint or the complaint
will not be accepted for filing, can raise a problem of the statute of limitations and
defeat an action. See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra, at 16-17.
10 It has been said that a lawyer who is unaware of the provisions of a national
rule is incompetent, but one who is unaware of the provisions of a local rule is
insulting.
11 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 9. The sheer volume of local rules and
the obligations imposed on counsel, particularly counsel from outside the district, to
become familiar with them helps explain the emphasis placed by the Local Rules
Project on needless duplication.
This figure does not include I.O.P.'s (Internal Operating Procedures) or standing
orders, which are discussed in the text that follows.
12 Subrin, supra note 5, at 2020.
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highly regarded trid judge. Each deals with a procedure the judge
has found effective and efficient in non-jury cases. One judge
requires that "[i]n all non-jury cases counsel for each of the parties
shall prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" to
be served on opposing counsel not later than fifteen days before
trial." Upon receipt of these proposed findings and conclusions
of law, opposing counsel is to:
(A) Underline with red pencil those portions which
he/she disputes,
(B) Underline with blue pencil those portions which
he/she admits,
(C) Underline with yellow pencil those portions which
he/she does not dispute, but deems irrelevant.
1 4
Another judge requires that proposed findings of fact be served
six weeks prior to the trial date. He too requires a response,
although there is no color code. Instead, there is to be underlining
for some purposes, bracketing for others, and the option of
substituting alternative findings. If this option is exercised by one
party, it triggers a reciprocal obligation on the part of the opposing
party.1
5
My purpose is not to evaluate, certainly not to criticize; it is to
describe. An awareness of the existence of standing orders and of
their diversity is useful in achieving a better appreciation of what
practitioners term the problem of local rules,16 but we need not
13 Richey, A Federal TrialJudge's Ref7ections on the Preparationfor and Trial of Civil
Cases, 52 IND. L.J. 111, 119 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
14 See id.
15 See Keeton, supra note 8, at 895.
16 The term "local local" rules, as distinguished from local rules, has been defined
as "standing orders of general applicability which apply only to cases before an
individual judge." H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 5, at 5 n.1a. In theory, one can
distinguish between a rule approved by the majority of the judges of a district court
which, by its terms, is applicable only to cases being heard by one of the judges and
a standing order similarly limited in applicability, but entered by an individualjudge
on her own authority.
The advisory committee's note to the 1985 amendment of Rule 83 speaks, albeit
in precatory rather than mandatory terms, to the role of the court as a whole in
policing the standing orders of an individual judge. The comment reads:
The practice pursued by some judges of issuing standing orders has been
controversial, particularly among members of the practicing bar. The last
sentence in Rule 83 has been amended to make certain that standing orders
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules or any local district court rules.
Beyond that, it is hoped that each district will adopt procedures, perhaps by
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be distracted from our central concern to deal in any depth with the
potential disadvantages inherent in standing orders, the advantages
they may offer, and procedures that might optimize the one and
minimize the other.
Local rules, even those that are inconsistent with the national
rules, have an important characteristic in common with the standing
orders described above. Each is designed to achieve what a judge
or group of judges see as some benefit, some increment of
efficiency or fairness for the litigants, the court, or the judicial
system as a whole. I am not altogether unsympathetic with that
effort and, indeed, I shall argue for allowing local rules that are
inconsistent with the national rules (1) for a specific purpose, (2) for
a specified period of time, and (3) subject to control by a mecha-
nism which would need to be established.
B. The Underlying Causes of Inconsistency
Before dealing with solutions there is the need to examine the
problem more carefully. It is useful to look at the present situation
and to ask: Why is there, what by now must be conceded to be,
rampant inconsistency between local and national rules? Approach-
ing the problem from a historical perspective, we find a related
question. Inconsistency was first identified as a problem in 1940,
shortly after the Federal Rules went into effect. 17 Why did the
standard-"not inconsistent with"-remain unchanged and the
problem continue, not only unabated, but exacerbated?
The Congress has not. been unaware of the twin problems of
proliferation and inconsistency in the area of local rules. Hearings
have been held" and legislation has been enacted, 19 but the
local rule, for promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985).
17 See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 969, 970
(1941) (abridged from REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITEE ON
LOCAL COURT RuLEs (1940), chaired byJudgeJohn C. Knox); Subrin, supra note 5,
at 2016.
18 See Letter from Edward T. Gignoux to Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier (July
22, 1983), ieprinted in Rules Enabling Act: Hearings on Oversight and H.R. 4144 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciaty, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 104 (1983-84) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R.
4144]; Letter from Russell Wheeler to David Beier (July 14, 1982), reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 4144, supra, at 181; Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1251 (1967), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 4144, supra at 314.
19 SeeJudicial Improvements and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title
IV, § 403(a)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988)),
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standard itself has not been changed. 20 Perhaps most striking is
the fact that so little attention has been focused on why it is that
inconsistency persists, indeed proliferates, even while it remains a
source of continuing concern.
1. "A Fluid Standard of Ambiguous Meaning"
What then are the underlying causes of inconsistency? A
number of factors appear responsible for the many instances of
inconsistency between local and national rules. A practitioner who
feels herself aggrieved by an offending local rule becomes painfully
aware of how inadequate the mechanisms for challenging such a
rule really are. Nor are mechanisms unimportant; we shall consider
them in due course. Mechanisms, however, are designed to enforce
standards and the standard to be enforced is far from clear.
Indeed, in an important work on local rules the late Professor David
Roberts called consistency a "fluid standard of ambiguous mean-
ing,"21 one that has not been a useful tool.22 This is certainly
true as a matter of historical fact, but the term was neither aban-
doned nor modified in the most recent amendment of Rule 83,23
and much of the difficulty seems to be in the way the Supreme
Court has interpreted Rule 83 rather than in any difficulties
inherent in the term itself.
It is useful to identify three distinct types of inconsistency, all of
which are proscribed by Rule 83. A national rule says there is no
'need to verify pleadings and a local rule provides that in all civil
rights cases the complaint must be verified. 24 The contradiction
is direct, the inconsistency apparent.
discussed in H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEWS 5986-89; see also Subrin, supra note 5, at 2019-20
(discussing legislative action on the issue of local rules).
20 Professor Roberts had called for abandoning the consistency standard in favor
of articulating quite specifically the areas within which local rules would be permitted
to operate. See Roberts, The Myth of Uniforainty in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil
Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 537,
552, 554 (1985). His criticism of the current standard as inadequate is described in
H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 5, at 15.
21 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 552.
22 See id. at 539. Understandably, Professor Roberts sharply criticized the Judicial
Conference for failure to jettison inconsistency as a standard when it proposed what
eventually became the 1985 amendment to Rule 83.
23 See supra note 2.
24 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 9, at 73 (finding this local rule in 16
jurisdictions).
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The national rules provide that pleadings shall be simple and
concise, and the appended forms illustrate the simplicity that is
intended. 25 A district court accepts both the prescription and the
example, choosing to quarrel with neither. However, by local rule
the district court does require a pretrial memorandum, detailed,
lengthy, and interpreted in the zealous spirit of an English judge
still sitting in the common law era, a veritable Baron Surrebutter.
As the Fourth Circuit made clear in the case of McCargo v. Hed-
rick,26 such a provision is totally against what the federal rules are
trying to accomplish; it is inconsistent with the spirit of the rules.
Sometimes a district court attempts, by local rule, to introduce
what has been termed a basic procedural innovation. At a time
when discovery was not available in admiralty (in fact, the General
Admiralty Rules rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governed in those proceedings) the Northern District Court of
Illinois promulgated a local rule that would have made discovery
generally available in admiralty. The court acted under the
authority of General Admiralty Rule 44, which empowered district
courts to promulgate local rules not inconsistent with the general
rules. This, said the Supreme Court in holding the rule invalid, was
a basic procedural innovation, and the introduction of basic
procedural innovations was beyond the proper function of local
rules.27 In a sense, such a local rule was inconsistent with the
basic scheme of the general rules.
Thirteen years later the Supreme Court had before it a local rule
promulgated by the District Court of Montana, which provided for
a six-person jury in civil cases, a much remarked upon departure
from the traditional twelve. The rule was challenged as a basic
procedural innovation, inappropriate for introduction by local rule.
The Supreme Court thought the change could hardly be considered
basic since the reduction in the number of persons serving on the
jury "plainly does not bear on the outcome of the litigation."28 It
25 Moreover, under Rule 84 as amended, these forms are declared "sufficient
under the rules," to remove any possible doubt about their sufficiency. See FED. R.
CIrv. P. 84.
26 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976).
27 See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
28 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 & n.23 (1973). In an interesting paper
delivered at a conference on local rules at Boston College on November 12, 1987,
Professor Burbank suggests that "if we are to take questions of power seriously...,
we cannot confine ourselves to the Supreme Court's few pronouncements in the
area-or put more provocatively, we cannot take Colgrove v. Battin seriously."
S. Burbank, Conference on Local Rules 2 (Nov. 12, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
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held the rule valid, contributing significantly to the widespread
adoption of six-person juries, although not to precision in defining
consistency as the term is used in Rule 83.29
The use of local rules to curtail abuse in the use of interrogato-
ries is particularly illuminating, underscoring basic discrepancies in
the attempt to define consistency. I refer specifically to limiting the
number of interrogatories to a figure specified in the local rule, in
some instances to as few as twenty, in others thirty or even fifty.
There is no such limit in Rules 26 or 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, the advisory committee specifically refused
to impose a limitation in terms of numbers and they further refused
to provide for local option, which would have authorized such
limitations.30 The advisory committee opted for case by case
controls on the use of interrogatories.
The Local Rules Project characterized local rules establishing such
limitations as basically in conflict with the national rules, and yet
found that fifty-four of the ninety-four districts had such limitations
in place.
31
Judge Robert E. Keeton, currently serving as chair of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference, has argued that since a litigant may make a motion
seeking permission to file additional interrogatories, so long as the
burden of proof is not placed on the movant there is no conflict.
Professor Burbank goes on to discuss Minerv. Atlass as a "preemption," denyinglocal
rules the right to deal with certain subjects that are to be limited to national
rulemaking. See id. at 2-3.
29 In Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) (striking down a local rule relating to
the admission of attorneys, promulgated by the Eastern District Court of Louisiana),
the Court acted pursuant to its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts, thus
avoiding the need to address the constitutional question. The opinion by Justice
Brennan found that the Supreme Court has the obligation "to ensure that these local
Rules are consistent with 'the principles of right and justice.'" Id. at 645. The
opinion, however, also quoted the requirement that the rules not be inconsistent with
the national rules. See id. at 646.
ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined byJustices O'Connor and Scalia, dissented on the
ground that the Court had no such authority, neither under its supervisory power nor
under its power to strike down invalid local rules. In his dissent, the ChiefJustice
described the four inquiries that the Court undertook in addressing challenges to the
validity of local rules: whether they conflicted with an Act of Congress, whether they
conflicted with the national rules, whether they were constitutionally infirm, and
whether the subject matter governed by the rule was within the power of a lower
federal court to regulate. See id. at 654 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Colgrov,
413 U.S. at 159-60, 162-64 and Miner, 363 U.S. at 651-52).
30 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 9, at 96.
31 See id.
15751991]
1576 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1567
What a fine line to drawl The issue, of course, is not whether the
limitation is good or bad, but rather whether it is consistent with
the national rules. At the least, the suggested distinction reflects
the difficulty of applying the "not inconsistent" test in a principled
and yet satisfactory manner.
In light of some of these difficulties, one can almost welcome
the refreshing candor that lies behind some local rules that have, in
effect, prefaced local rules with a clarifying preamble stating: "The
national rule notwithstanding...."
2. Challenging Inconsistent Rules: The Mechanisms Available
The absence of agreement concerning what we mean by
consistency is certainly more important than the procedural
problems inherent in the effort to deal with local rules that are
admittedly inconsistent. The latter, however, cannot be ignored. It
is quite clear that the mechanisms for challenging local rules on the
ground that they are inconsistent with the national rules have,
historically, been inadequate. Appellate review is not readily
available. Theoretically, appeal is virtually always an option;
realistically, this is rarely the case. What litigant, what litigator,
would willingly suffer an adverse final judgment by flouting a rule
promulgated by the majority of the judges of the court in which the
case is being tried, no matter how clear the inconsistency may
appear?32 There have in fact been cases in which appellate courts
did pass on the validity of local rules. Some of these have been
significant,33 but as an effective means of assuring compliance with
the limitations imposed by Rule 83 and the underlying statute, this
traditional mechanism of review of lower court actions is simply
unequal to the task.
Two new mechanisms of policing local rules have been devel-
oped quite recently: one involves the circuit councils and the other
an arm of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The
Congress has given the circuit judicial councils explicit authority to
32 Where failure to comply with a local rule has resulted in dismissal without any
consideration of the merits by the trial court, appeal on the ground that the local rule
is void for inconsistency can be expected and may be successful. See e.g., Hall v.
Commissioner, 805 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting failure to attach a motion for
rule nisi along with the complaint).
Prerogative writs, such as mandamus, are available in some circumstances and
can in those circumstances be used to gain appellate review. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at
150. By definition, however, they are rarely available.
33 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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abrogate local rules,34 and the Advisory Committee notes to the
1985 amendment of Rule 83 make clear that the authority vested in
the councils was intended to be accompanied by a reciprocal
obligation. The judicial councils are expected to undertake their
own review of local rules, even existing rules, and to evaluate them
in terms of prudential concerns, e.g., inter-district uniformity, as
well as technical validity. 5 It is noteworthy that an administrative
arm of the judiciary, a circuit council, is asked to review and, where
appropriate, to abrogate local rules promulgated by a district
court.
3 6
Even before the Congress acted, the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States commissioned what is known as the Local Rules Project, a
careful analysis of each local rule currently in effect in each of the
district courts. In an initial report over 500 pages long, the Project
identified inconsistencies and redundancies, inviting the attention
of each court to the local rules considered problematic.
These two mechanisms should be viewed as complementary,
each reinforcing the other. The Judicial Conference, operating
through its committees, and supported by appropriate research, can
provide initiative and guidance, a welcome alternative to the
initiative traditionally provided, and provided inadequately, by the
adversary system. 7 The task of assuring that duly promulgated
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988). This legislation, and the amended Rule 83,
permits thejudicial council of each circuit to abrogate local rules that are inconsistent
with the national rules or statutes. It might be argued that by providing that "[e]ach
judicial council shall make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and
expeditious administration ofjustice within its circuit," id. § 332(d)(1), Congress had
already vested that power in the circuit councils. See 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K.
SINCLAIR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 83.02 (2d ed. 1990). In any event, the authority to
abrogate has now been vested by the Congress in explicit terms.
3' The Advisory Committee noted its "expectation... that the judicial council will
examine all local rules, including those currently in effect, with an eye toward
determining whether they are valid and consistent with the Federal Rules, promote
inter-district uniformity and efficiency, and do not undermine the basic objectives of
the Federal Rules." FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985).
3 See Letter from Professor Stephen Burbank to the Committee on Practice and
Procedure (Feb. 27, 1984), reprinted in Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R.
2633 and H.RL 3550 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 29 (1985)
(discussing the question of the power of ajudicial council to nullify a local rule and,
in that context, noting a 1937 proposal, ultimately rejected, that would have required
the approval of a majority of the circuit judges of a circuit as a precondition for
promulgation of a local rule).
37 The Judicial Conference, however, should not be expected to take action to
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local rules are both valid and appropriate is assigned to the circuit
councils; they are charged with the obligation and vested with power
equal to the task.
Preliminary review of thae changes effected to date is not overly
encouraging, although the problem is too complex and the time that
has elapsed too short to make any definitive assessment.3 8 It is
clear, however, that at least some judicial councils are involved in
the process of oversight and are having an impact- 9
The important point, however, is that the present proposal to
recognize and to permit local rules that are inconsistent with the
abrogate particular district court local rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(2) (1988)
(describing the role of the Conference with respect to local rules promulgated by
courts other than the district courts). Whatever the outer limits of its authority, it
would be totally inappropriate for the Conference to be viewed as the revising
authority for the local rules of 94 district courts.
8 The Report of the Local Rules Project was distributed to the chiefjudges of the
district courts in April 1989 with a cover letter from the chair of the Judicial Confer-
ence Committee on Practice and Procedure. See supra note 9. Included was a list of
questionable rules adopted by the particular district as well as the more general
material termed the treatise. In the summer of 1990, we examined the local rules of
each district to learn what changes had been effected in the rules characterized as
objectionable because of inconsistency. No attempt was made to evaluate the
response to objections because of redundancy or unnecessary repetition of the
national rules.
While a fair number of rules had been deleted and some amended, it is fair to
characterize the results as far from reflecting general compliance. How soon should
one expect compliance to be evident? This is a difficult question, for there must be
a fairly significant period for adoption of amendments. This is particularly true
under the current statute which requires notice and comment. In addition, one must
allow time for printing and general distribution. One circuit, for example, reported
that although the work of review and revision has been under way for some time, it
was expected that another six months would be needed for the project to be
completed.
In addition, the Local Rules Project itself indicated that certain local rules were
being forwarded to the Advisory Committee for consideration of the desirability of
amendment of the national rules. This was true with respect to limitations on the
number of interrogatories. See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 9, at 99.
Understandably, one should not expect 54 of the 94 districts to abrogate their local
rules in the interim. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
-9 A telephone survey of the offices of the circuit executives in January 1991
yielded instances in which the circuit councils had discussed particular local rules and
the district courts had taken action in conformity with that discussion. One circuit
reported that a standing order was abrogated. Another circuit reported a procedure
under which a district court could obtain an informal advisory opinion prior to
formally promulgating a rule.
It is useful to recall that an appellate court, acting on a request for a writ of
mandamus directed to a district courtjudge, will frequently indicate no need for the
writ to issue formally once the court has made its views known. This is a form of
civility that can also operate with respect to the circuit councils and the district courts.
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national rules, albeit in limited circumstances and under controlled
conditions, is not dependent on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness
of mechanisms designed to extirpate inconsistency. If anything, the
more effective new mechanisms become in eliminating inconsisten-
cies, the more important it is to consider the need for a safety valve,
a system for tolerating, and perhaps even fostering, inconsistent
alternatives in a limited number of districts.
II. ON THE UTILITY OF INFORMED INCONSISTENCY
In order to evaluate the present situation properly, it is
necessary to go beyond the narrow technicalities of what is or is not
consistent and inquire whether inconsistency is necessarily bad. Are
there redeeming features to inconsistency that may help explain why
courts seem so determined to read the requirement of consistency
as though it were not there?
I suggest that we are dealing with nothing less than how courts,
impatient with the failure of the national system to solve pressing,
indeed urgent, procedural problems, utilize local rules in an effort
to shape pragmatic solutions. In short, we are dealing with the
dynamic of procedural progress, or to use a more neutral term, one
route to procedural change.
Judges perceive problems: discovery abuse, frivolous civil rights
suits, or simply inordinately heavy caseloads. Solutions are
proposed, and the judges either have confidence in them or are
willing to try them because others have confidence in them.
40
Local rules offer the most expeditious means of experimenting.
41
Court-annexed arbitration for ordinary civil suits below a
specified amount in controversy provides a good example. Until the
40 This is the usual pattern. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. Howev-
er, where problems become sufficiently pressing, a court may be willing to
experiment without anyone being confident in the success of the proposal; all that is
required is that it appears worth trying under the theory that doing something is
better than nothing.
41 Prior to the amendment of § 2071 in 1988, the judges of the court could act
without consulting any other authority and with no need to involve the bar or even
to inform the bar in advance of promulgation, if they so chose. Since the amend-
ment, notice and the opportunity to comment is, of course, required, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071(b) (1988), but it hardly serves as an impediment if the court feels strongly
about the proposed rule. See id. § 2071(e) (allowing a court to prescribe rules without
notice or the opportunity to comment if the court determines that there is an
immediate need for the rule). Of course, even prior to the amendment, some judges
would go to great lengths to involve the bar in the planning of innovations, both to
assist in refining the proposed rule and to insure support after promulgation.
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passage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of
1988,42 there was no specific legislative authority for such pro-
grams. When the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, popularly known
as the Pound Conference, convened in April 1976, one of its major
themes was increased utilization of alternative means of dispute
resolution.43 The American Bar Association, a co-sponsor of the
Conference, appointed a Follow-Up Task Force, which was chaired
by Griffin Bell, formerly a judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and soon to become Attorney General in the Carter
Administration. 44 One of the recommendations of the Task Force
was increased use of court-annexed arbitration to help courts cope
with mounting caseloads. 45  The federal courts were mentioned
specifically, and when Judge Bell became Attorney General he
actively urged experimentation with court-annexed arbitration in
three federal district courts. Courts that adopted the program did
so by promulgating a local rule.
Use of local rules to launch these alternative dispute resolution
programs has been roundly condemned as a blatant example of a
basic procedural innovation, proscribed by the Supreme Court as
inappropriate for local rules.46  At the same time, it has been
defended as clearly within the scope of a district court's rule-making
power.47 Would the technicality of inconsistency have deterred
the proponents?
Consider civil rights litigation. District after district requires
that the complaint in such cases be verified, directly contrary to
Rule 11.48 And sometimes by rule and sometimes by judicial
decision, new standards of specificity in the pleading of these cases
42 Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C., arbitration tide codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988)).
43 See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTiVES ONJUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. L. Levin & R. R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
44 See id. at 295.
45 See id. at 309.
46 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 544 (introducing his discussion of these rules as
follows: "[a]nother type of local rule exists that is so violently at odds with some of
the most fundamental policies embodied in the federal rules that it is almost
inconceivable that a district court would adopt it").47 See Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 29, 49-51 (1985). It should be noted, however, that this work relies
heavily on the provisions of Rule 16 as amended in 1983. Professor Roberts' work
was published posthumously in 1985. However, the major programs were
implemented by local rule prior to the amendment of Rule 16.
48 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 9, at 73-76.
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have been introduced. 49 How can such action be defended?
Basically, when the inconsistency is not simply ignored, the attitude
is one of the end justifying the means: we will achieve improve-
ments.
On a more sophisticated level the argument is made that there
is a perceived good in diversity, in allowing experiments on a small
scale. Local rules will inform national rulemaking, thus benefitting
the system as a whole. In this vein, Judge Jack Weinstein, a
foremost authority in the area of rulemaking, has referred to the
district courts as laboratories, 50 and it is clear that as a society we
value laboratories and their research as an important national
resource.
To continue the metaphor, however, we have very busy
laboratories, some ninety-four of them, but virtually no one is
49 See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (requiring "a
higher [pleading] standard than that generally provided for in the Federal Rules" in
Bivens claims alleging unconstitutional motive), afd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1789
(1991). ChiefJudge Wald dissented in part, arguing that plaintiff should be allowed
limited discovery in order to enable him "to supplement his originally, perhaps
necessarily, sketchy complaint." 895 F.2d at 807 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on the ground that plaintiff had alleged
no violation of a liberty interest, without reaching the question of the propriety of a
heightened pleading standard. See 111 S. Ct. 1789.
In Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976), the court
reversed dismissal of two civil rights complaints for failure of the district courtjudge
to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend. It nevertheless reaffirmed a heightened
pleading standard in civil rights claims observing that plaintiff's "allegations state no
-facts upon which to weigh the substantiality of the claim." Id. at 923. Judge Gibbons,
concurring and dissenting, objected to the pleading standard on the ground that the
court had no authority to contravene Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. at 927 (Gibbons, J., concurring and dissenting).
Rotolo continues to be cited with approval. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Town-
ship, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988). In Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d
1111 (3d Cir. 1988), the court recognized that its "specificity rule in civil rights cases
may on the surface appear to be in tension with the liberal notice pleading approach
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," but noted that district courts are required
to permit amendments and, further, that plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable amount
of discovery "'to help... make the necessary showing to prove her case.'" Id. at 1114
(citing Colburm, 838 F.2d at 670).
The Local Rules Project reports that 32 districts "have local rules requiring civil
rights actions to be filed on standard forms available from the court." LOCAL RULES
PROJECT, supra note 9, at 77. It finds these "inconsistent with existing law" and
recommends that they be rescinded. See id. The Project notes that, while probably
intended to aid prisoners, such local rules "could also be a hurdle to civil rights
litigants and especially to pro se litigants." Id.
" See Letter from Judge Jack Weinstein to Steven Flanders (March 29, 1978),
quoted in Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or
Information?, 14 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 213, 219 n. 35 (1981).
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collecting data. With a few notable exceptions, results are reported
on the basis of impressions: "We think this is working... the bar
seems satisfied, or at least the bar can live with it." A notable
exception is probably the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which has
from the very beginning of its court-annexed arbitration program
been collecting data and reporting it.5 1 This practice had a
profound effect on the shaping of the authorizing legislation when
the Congress acted in 1988.52
The focus of our attention at this juncture should not be on
extirpating all inconsistency, but rather on harnessing and control-
ling it for the benefit of the judicial system as a whole. The district
court forays speak to underlying problems and inform us of
perceived solutions. We should affirmatively encourage useful
experimentation, controlled experiments, because we need, and
want, and can profit from them. One might suggest that we can
achieve a greater measure of consistency in the long run by
channeling and controlling, rather than fighting to eliminate
inconsistency.
A. The Advisoty Committee's 1983 Proposal
In 1983 the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
endorsed the basic idea of utilizing local rules as experiments,
including it in a proposed amendment to Rule 83.53 That propos-
al was duly forwarded to the Standing Committee on Practice and
Procedure and circulated :for comment to bench and bar by the
Standing Committee.54 In the notes accompanying the draft the
Advisory Committee credited the work of Stephen Flanders,55 a
strong defender of local rules, who himself had credited Judge
Weinstein.
56
51 See, e.g., Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.BA.J. 64, 64-
65 (1983); see also, Broderick, Court-annexed Compulsoy Arbitration: It Works, 72
JUDICATURE 217,220 (1989) (stating that from the time the program was initiated in
February 1978 to June 30, 1988, 17,006 of the total 71,588 civil cases were put into
the arbitration program and that of these, 15,779 had been terminated and only 388
required trial de novo.)
52 See Court-annexed Arbitration and Experimentation: Hearings on H.RL 4341 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the Comm. on
theJudiciay, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-16 (1986) (testimony of'Judge Raymond Broderick
of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).53 See Preliminay Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
98 F.R.D. 339, 353, 370-73 (1983) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].
54 See id. at 371-73.
5 See id. at 372 (citing Flanders, supra note 50, at 219).
See Flanders, supra note 50, at 219 n.35. Judge Weinstein extolled local rules
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Consistency with the national rules was not to be required of
rules that were avowedly experimental. It was not that inconsistency
was permitted; the statute provided unambiguously to the contrary.
It was simply that experimental local rules were to be immunized
from challenge on the ground of inconsistency for a period of two
years.
57
The proposal was seriously flawed and was soon abandoned.
The most serious problem was lack of authority to promulgate a
rule that would have been in violation of the governing statute.
Congress had explicitly prohibited local rules inconsistent with the
national rules;58 flatly contradicting the statute, the amendment
stated that inconsistency is sometimes permissible. Couching that
permission in procedural terms-prohibiting a challenge on the
ground of inconsistency for a period of years-could not camouflage
the contradiction. 59 In short, the basic idea was good, but authori-
ty was lacking.
60
as encouraging "initiative and imaginative development of new ideas in a variety of
different settings." Id. He also applauded the use of local rules as "laboratories." See
id.
57 Public notice and the opportunity to comment was to be required in advance
of promulgation, and prior approval by thejudicial council of the circuit was also to
be required in the case of experimental rules. See ProposedAmendments, supra note 53,
at 370.
M Section 2071 empowers "all courts established by Act of Congress" to promul-
gate local rules which "shall be consistent with ... [the] rules... prescribed" by the
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988).
9 It might be argued that the grant of power to the Supreme Court in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072, pursuant to which the national rules are promulgated, provides an indepen-
dent basis for Rule 83 and hence for local rules. As a corollary, if the Supreme Court
provides in Rule 83 for inconsistent local rules under specified conditions, and
Congress has allowed that provision to become law, there is no need to conform to
the restrictions of § 2071. This analysis, however, is of doubtful validity. See
Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Some Questions about Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1011 (1983). Moreover, as a
matter of policy it would appear desirable to involve the Congress at the authoriza-
tion stage in shaping what is, in a very literal sense, a basic procedural innovation, at
least with respect to the procedure of fashioning and testing new rules. See infra note
68 and accompanying text.
60 There were other respects in which the proposal could have benefitted from
revision, for example the two-year limit on certain experiments. Alternatives will be
discussed infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
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B. More- Recent Developments
Rule 83 was in fact amended in 1985, with no mention of
experimentation or permissive inconsistency with the national rules.
A deep silence concerning local rules as experiments might have
been thought to have relegated that proposal to the irrelevant past.
That, however, has not been the case; the silence has not been long
sustained. In 1985, a very valuable contribution to the literature of
local rules by the late Professor David Roberts, published posthu-
mously in the University of Puget Sound Law Review (actually
completed after his death by associates), endorsed experimentation
by local rule.61 The specific subject is treated quite briefly, but
with insight and with conviction.
Most recently, Professor Laurens Walker, focusing on the need
to move from hunch and guess to soundly derived data as a basis
for drafting and amending procedural provisions, has argued that
the most cost-effective pattern of experimentation is restricted field
experimentation, i.e. by local rule promulgated in specific dis-
tricts. 62 The time is propitious for examining in some detail the
conditions on which local experimentation inconsistent with the
national rules should be allowed.
C. Allocation of Power and the Conditions
of Experimentation
To vest unfettered discretion in each district to "experiment" as
it sees fit, would be a prescription for disaster. It is hard to
conceive of any change in. the national rules, introduced for any
period of time, that could not qualify in absolute good faith as an
effort to experiment with a preferred local provision. 63  The
61 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 554.
62 See Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (Summer 1988). This valuable work,
although appearing in a volume which carries the date of Summer 1988, was not
distributed in time to be available to the author in October 1989 when the Roberts
Lecture, on which the present piece is based, was delivered.
In the context of alternative dispute resolution, the Federal Court Study Commit-
tee made the following recommendations in 1990: "Congress should broaden
statutory authorization for local rules for alternative and supplementary procedures
in civil litigation, including rules for cost and fee incentives," and "Congress should
authorize and provide funds for sustained experimentation with alternative and
supplementary techniques, subject to the guidelines recommended below and any
other limitations Congress may deem advisable." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURT
STUDY COMMrrrEE 81, 83, 85-86 (1990).
6" Notice and comment might prove something of a deterrent, but the judges
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significant question is under what conditions, with what controls
exercised by what mechanisms should experimentation be allowed?
To answer that question it is useful to take note, at least briefly,
of the division of power as it currently relates to rule-making. The
Congress and the judiciary share power in the matter of rule-
making. That is familiar enough.64 Within the federal judicial
system some power is vested nationally, in the Supreme Court and
the Judicial Conference for example;65 some is vested regionally,
in the circuit councils for example;66 and some is vested locally, in
the judges of the district courts.
With the enactment of provisions calling for notice and the
opportunity to comment as a prerequisite for adoption of local
rules, the judiciary no longer has the authority to promulgate local
rules without some measure of participation by "outsiders." In this
limited sense, power is no longer vested exclusively in governmental
entities. The views of others must be solicited and presumably
considered; an opportunity to be heard must be extended to the bar
and, I would suggest, as a prudential matter, it should be extended
to other consumers as well.67
1. The Need for Legislation
Any program of experimentation by local rule should be
authorized by Congress.68  Such authorization need not be and
retain the authority to promulgate. Moreover, notice and comment does not
necessarily provide the court with the views of lawyers who do not reside in the
district, but who regularly appear before the court in the course of a national
practice.
64 Although it borders on the trite, it may be well to remember that the 1983
proposal for amendment of Rule 83 fell precisely for the failure to recognize this fact.
On the role of the Supreme Court see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 20 7 2(a)'(1988) (stating
"[tihe Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure"), and on the role of the Judicial Conference see, e.g., id. § 2073 (a)(1)
(stating "[t]heJudicial Conference shall prescribe and publish the procedures for the
consideration of proposed rules under this section"). Moreover, the various rules
committees are committees of the Judicial Conference.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988); FED. R. Crv. P. 83.
67 As previously noted, although a rule promulgated without affording the bar the
opportunity to comment would be invalid, once that opportunity is afforded, the
majority of the active judges of the district may act as they deem appropriate. In this
sense, they do not share power. Moreover, the opportunity to comment may be
afforded by a variety of mechanisms; it certainly does not contemplate service of
papers on every member of the bar and on interested consumer groups.
6' The reference is to a duly enacted statute that is presented to the President.
In one sense, if the Supreme Court promulgates an amended Rule 83 which provides
for experimentation by local rule, even rules inconsistent with the national rules, and
1991] 1585
1586 UNIVERSITYOFPEANNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1567
should not be for each experiment, but rather for a system of
experimentation under conditions defined generally in the legisla-
tion. In a narrow sense, legislation is needed to authorize experi-
ments that are inconsistent with the national rules. More generally,
experimentation by local rule is in itself a basic innovation in the
rule-making process in which the Congress should be involved. This
is particularly true if such experiments include random assignment
of cases to control groups, permitting some litigants to experience
the benefits thought to accrue from a new rule, while other litigants
are denied the opportunity solely to make possible rigorous
evaluation of the effects of the change. 69 There is no reason to
believe that Congress would not give its approval to such a rule. On
the contrary, there is every reason to believe, on the basis of recent
history, that congressional approval would be forthcoming.
70
A new statute is not, however, a prerequisite of all further
experimentation by local rule. Absent a problem of inconsistency
with the national rules, innovations at the district level, implement-
ed by local rule, are not proscribed and the study of data generated
as a result is certainly not proscribed. Such experimentation has in
fact taken place in the past, quite legitimatelyand the possibility of
further experimentation, undefined in scope, has recently been
recognized, if not validated, by the Congress. The history of the
Congress fails to express its disapproval, the Congress has "approved". This may have
been the theory behind the 1983 proposal. The fact is, however, that inaction is not
the equivalent of affirmative passage of an amended statute authorizing inconsistent
local rules for purpose of experimentation. For one thing, there has been no
presentment affording the President the opportunity to veto. See supra note 59; see
also Burbank, supra note 59, at 1011 (discussing this argument further).
I See Walker, supra note 62, at 81-83 (discussing EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAw:
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTA-
TION N THE LAW (1981) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW]). For further
details concerning the composition of the committee and other aspects of its work,
see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
70 In this regard the experience with respect to court-annexed arbitration,
discussed below, is instructive. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
The unique role of Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, chair of
the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration ofJustice
of the HouseJudiciary Committee during the relevant period, should also be noted.
After 32 years in the House, Kastenmeier is no longer in the Congress. For a tribute
to Kastenmeier and the "strong working relationship" between him, his chief counsel,
Mike Remington, and the courts, see Kastenmeier Wraps Up Distinguished Congressional
Career, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1990, at 1. For recent evidence of congressional
interest in experimentation and the evaluation of experimental programs, see Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title I, § 105(c), 104 Stat. 5089,
5098.
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provisions governing court-annexed arbitration, included in the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,71 is instructive.
For well over a decade federal courts had, by local rule,
instituted court-annexed programs of alternative dispute resolu-
tion7 2 and Congress appropriated funds for these programs. The
requests for funds were processed through the appropriation
committees and subcommittees, and until 1988 no substantive
legislation had been enacted expressly permitting court-annexed
arbitration in federal district courts. Such legislation, it should be
noted, fell under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committees.
Opinions differed as to whether such legislation was needed, but in
1988 the Congress did enact a comprehensive statute governing
court-annexed arbitration, to become effective in the spring of 1989.
The legislation lists ten districts by name as authorized to have such
programs and then provides that the Judicial Conference of the
United States may authorize ten additional districts to institute such
programs.73 There is a five-year sunset provision and there are
limitations, for example on jurisdictional amount and on permissi-
ble sanctions.
74
The legislation recognized, confirmed, and extended an
experimental program, which remained clearly experimental.
However, there were other experiments in federal ,district courts,
including programs that utilized other forms of alternative dispute
resolution.75 To avoid the risk that this legislation would be read
as casting doubt on any of these other programs, the Act includes
a striking provision. Section 904 provides, in its entirety: "Nothing
in this title, or in chapter 44, as added by section 901 of this Act
[court-annexed arbitration] is intended to abridge, modify, or
enlarge the rule making powers of the Federal judiciary."
76
It is clear that the Congress did not want its action with respect
to court-annexed arbitration to be read as making any statement
with respect to other experiments or other local rules.
77
71 See Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 901-07, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-64 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988)).72 See Levin & Golash, supra note 47, at 29. For variations in the details of these
programs, see id. at 32 n.15.
7s See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 901, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-63 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 658 (1988)).
74 See id. §§ 901, 906, 102 Stat. 4659-60, 4664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651 note,
652 (1988)).
75 See Levin & Golash, supra note 47, at 36-42.
76 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 904, 102 Stat. 4642, 4663 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 651 note (1988)).
7 See infra text accompanying note 100 (discussing the possibility of allowing
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2. Permission to be Inconsistent
Under this proposal a district court78 would need permission
to be inconsistent with the national rules even for the purpose of
experimentation. Such a requirement is essential to avoid the
possibility of disruptive disuniformity. For example, it is hard to
envision a district court being allowed, even on a trial basis, to
forbid all discovery in all cases for a two year period. Even an
experimenting district court remains part of the federal judicial
system. A local rule with lesser sweep, one abolishing all interroga-
tories for a similar period, or all discovery in all cases under $50,000
also seems highly problematic.
Then there are prudential concerns. Some proposals may
arguably be against congressional policy and thus undesirable, not
because the judiciary would lack the authority, but rather because
it may be unwise to exercise it. Take the imposition of attorney fees
as sanctions, or the elimination of a statutorily granted right to
attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct in the course of the
litigation. The question is not power but prudence.
79
Routine bifurcation of liability and damages for trial is another
example, discussed in the literature,8° of a proposal thought not
suitable for implementation by local rule because it is too likely to
affect the substantive outcome of litigation.
Who shall be charged with granting or, perchance, even
withholding the requisite permission? Many models for a suitable
mechanism for administration of these requirements are avail-
able.8 1 One must ask first whether this authority shall be vested
regionally or nationally. The answer is not self-evident, but on
balance the importance of a national perspective weighs heavily in
inconsistency where it serves the goal of experimentation, even with "basic procedural
innovations").78 Although this Paper focuses on local rules promulgated by district courts and
on experimentation by district courts, the courts of appeals also have local rules and
also have the need to experiment. The same is true of bankruptcy courts, although
the relation of the latter to the district courts may require rethinking of certain
specifics. The basic analysis is intended to be applicable to all federal courts other
than the Supreme Court.
79 ee Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH.J.L.
REF. 425 (1986).
8o See Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation ofJury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rulemaking Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 834 (1961).
81 See supra note 57 (noting that the 1983 preliminary draft of an amendment to
Rule 83 called for authorization by the judicial council of the circuit); Roberts, supra
note 20, at 553 (calling for approval by the Judicial Conference of the United States).
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favor of vesting this authority in a single mechanism, charged with
acting on requests from all over the country, and hence one which
must be national rather than regional.
A number of factors argue for this conclusion. There are times
when the same experiment should be undertaken in different
districts located in different parts of the country. The possibility of
random selection, not in terms of individual litigants but in terms
of.district courts, has already commanded attention.8 2 It is far less
problematic, in terms of the normal reaction of individuals familiar
with "our federalism," to accept significant differences in procedure
based on geography rather than random identification of individuals
who find themselves in the same court before the same judge.
Instrumentalities organized by circuit would be cumbersome in
terms of developing and monitoring such programs.
Experiments, even if designed toward a single end, need not be
identical, nor need the variations all be tried in the same circuit.
Again, a national perspective is preferable. Finally, sensitivity to the
concerns expressed earlier-the need to avoid disruptive disuniform-
ity and to consider conflicting congressional policies-seems best
protected through a national mechanism.
8 3
Given the desirability of a national perspective, alternative
mechanisms are still possible. The Judicial Conference Committee
on Rules Practice and Procedure offers the advantage of an existing
structure, one with a tradition of high quality leadership. Neverthe-
less, one must ask whether experimentation by local rule would be
* a major concern of this busy Committee or an added chore of
relatively peripheral significance. Further, would this Committee be
hospitable, and be perceived as hospitable, to experimentation
designed to challenge operating principles and policy decisions
adopted by the Committee in the course of its primary duties?
A new committee of the Judicial Conference charged with
supervising and administering a program of experimentation would
offer the advantage of a fresh perspective from which to view
82 See Walker, supra note 62, at 75 n.47; EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, supra note
62, at 20.
83 Relations with Congress often require informal consultation rather than the yes-
no decision-making typical of adjudication. The Brookings Institution has successfully
sponsored a number of productive seminars at which representatives of the judiciary
have met with key congressional personnel and members of the Judiciary Committees,
for example, in informal sessions to help define problems and explore possible solu-
tions. See Cannon & Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation in Improving the Administration of
Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1981).
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proposals brought to the committee as well as initiatives suggested
by the committee. This alternative appears clearly preferable.
The new committee and the presently existing committees would
complement each other. Some overlap in membership would be
essential, but this is not difficult to achieve. As will be more fully
developed below, coordination with existing agencies as well as with
otherJudicial Conference committees would be highly desirable and
statutory models exist to. assure precisely that type of coordina-
tion.8
4
3. Assuring Productive Laboratories
To experiment without paying due regard to the resulting data
is an exercise in self-contradiction. Nor can impressionistic
accounts of the effects of particular procedures substitute for hard
data.8 5 By the same token, it is of little use to collect data pro-
duced by experiments that are so poorly or improperly designed
that they cannot serve as the proper basis for solid conclusions.
Moreover, it has been wisely said that where human subjects are
involved, a poorly or improperly designed experiment "is by
definition unethical."
8 6
Permission to promulgate a local rule that conflicts with a
national rule should be conditioned on an experimental design that
may be expected to yield valid data and to facilitate the collection
and reporting of that data.
7
Beyond questions of scientific validity, ethical considerations
arise in connection with the decision to deny certain individuals the
opportunity to benefit from a procedure presumptively beneficial,
84 For a more encompassing treatment of inter-branch relationships, seeJUDGEs
AND LEGISLATORs (R. Katzmann ed. 1988). Note also that coordination between
committees, e.g., the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Committee on the
Administration of the Federal Magistrates System, has been necessary and successful.
See also infra note 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing duties of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
8 See Walker, sura note 62, at 68 (citing Posner, The SummaiyJuty Trial and Other
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L.
REV. 366, 367 (1986)).
86 EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAw, supra note 62, at 15 (quoting Rutstein, The
Ethical Design of Human xperiments, in EXPERIMENTATION wrrT HUMAN SUBJECTs 384
(P. Freund ed. 1970)).
87 We need not enter the controversy as to whether any design that does not
incorporate a control group, randomly selected, can be valid or even be termed an
"experiment". Compare Walker, supra note 62, with EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW,
supra note 62, at 16-21 (discussing such alternatives as Comparison-Group Designs
and Before-After Designs).
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while that right is accorded to other individuals randomly selected.
While it is true that society might learn a great deal from a
sustained program of sentencing convicted offenders on a random
basis, one receiving the maximum permissible jail sentence and
another released on parole, it is highly doubtful that any such
program of experimentation would be viewed as "ethical" so as to
allow it to be implemented by a court of this country.
88
It would be wrong to view the committee charged with supervis-
ing experimentation as a corporate Commissar of Ethics. It is
appropriate, however, for such a committee to be concerned that
any court proposing an experiment consider the ethical implications
of a particular course of conduct. A committee appointed by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger and chaired by ChiefJudge Edward D. Re
of the United States Court of International Trade,89 grappled with
these problems and prepared a list of the factors to be considered
and the procedures to be followed when would-be researchers
confront these issues.90 One need only ask that these issues be
considered, but one should demand no less.
Technical support is essential in planning and evaluating the
types of programs here envisioned. Similarly, professional support
of the highest quality would also be needed to evaluate and
interpret the data generated. Logistical support for such tasks as
data gathering would also be required. Such support could be
provided by the Federal Judicial Center, an agency created by
Congress, which is charged not only with conducting research in
8 This is not to minimize the possibility of successful constitutional challenge on
equal protection grounds. For a discussion of the legal basis for controlled
experiments in the context of local rules see Walker, supra note 62, at 70, 75. See also
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, supra note 62, at 67-76 (discussing authority and
procedures for undertaking program experiments).
89 Other members of the committee included AlvinJ. Bronstein of the National
Prison Project of the A.C.L.U., Professor Alexander M. Capron of the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, ChiefJudge Wilfred Feinberg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, Jane Frank-Harman, Esq., Professor Paul A. Freund, Professor
Gerald Gunther, Professor Alasdair McIntyre (Philosophy and Political Science), Dean
Norman Redlich,JeromeJ. Shestack, Esq.,JudgeJoseph T. Sneed of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,Judge Abraham D. Sofaer of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, and Professor June Louin Tapp (Child
Psychology and CriminalJustice Studies). Advisors included Joel Zimmerman of the
National Center for State Courts, Assistant Attorney General DanielJ. Meador, and
Assistant Attorney General Maurice Rosenberg. William B. Eldridge, Director of
Research, FederalJudicial Center and his colleagues Gordon Bermant, E. Allan Lind,
and John E. Shapard served as staff.
90 See EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, supra note 62, at 49-65.
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judicial administration but also with stimulating research by
others.9 1 If additional funding is needed to accomplish these
goals, it would be money well spent.
92
The closest coordination between diverse elements of the
federal judicial system would be necessary in implementing a
program of experimentation adequate to the needs of that system.
Congress has, however, patterns to follow. For example, by statute,
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts sits on the Board of the Federal Judicial Center, 93 and the
Director of the Center sits, again by statute, on the Advisory
Committee of the National Institute of Corrections.
9 4
District courts would not be obliged to gain permission for
experimentation unless a proposed provision would conflict with the
national rules.95 Nevertheless, it would be desirable to stimulate
collection of data even where local rules are not inconsistent with
national rules. 6 With the Federal Judicial Center prepared-and
funded-to grant technical and professional assistance to district
courts in aid of such experimentation on a far broader scale than
heretofore, we might hope for a far more intensive program of
learning what does and -does not work well as we adjust our
procedures to cope with new problems and new challenges. There
is so much more we need to know to make access to justice a reality
91 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29, 623(a)(6) (1988).
" See Walker, supra note 62, at 72-77 (offering an analysis of the cost and benefits
of research methods).
93 See 28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1988).
94 See 18 U.S.C. § 4351(b) (1988).
95 The prohibition against a rule that conflicted with a statute or abridged substan-
tive rights would remain unaffected. The national committee on experimentation
would have no authority to approve a local rule that ran afoul of these provisions,
even to encourage experimentation.
9 A primary purpose of local rules was to provide flexibility in order to meet local
conditions. We have much to learn about which conditions are indeed local and
whether there is, indeed, a great degree of commonality among the problems each
district conceives as unique to it.
In this connection, it is useful to note that while Professor Walker's focus is on
experimentation in aid of the national rules, the present proposal is not so limited.
There may be situations in which options by district are desirable, even with the
general desirability of uniformity in mind. This may be so because of genuinely local
conditions or it may be because the resultant disuniformity is minor. Nor does this
imply that local rules should deal only with "trivial" issues, however trivial be defined
or perceived. For example, practicing lawyers, academics, and deputy clerks may have
different opinions on the significance of local rules, promulgated pursuant to Rule
77(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, determining whether the clerk's office
should be open on Saturdays and, if so, for how long.
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for more people in our society, that incremental progress, of any
significance at all, should be welcomed.
4. Consistency Revisited
Earlier we considered the difficulty in defining consistency for
purposes of interpreting Rule 83, 97 contributing to what Professor
Roberts has termed the "myth of uniformity." 8 He called for
"bright-line" guidance; 99 in contrast, the proposal offered here
envisions controlled inconsistency. Rather than undertaking a new
verbalization, whether by defining categories appropriate for local
rule-making or otherwise, 100 we would create a mechanism for
allowing inconsistency when inconsistency serves a defined, useful
purpose: that of experimentation. The problem of definition is not
eliminated. But the primary justification for tolerating uncontrolled
inconsistency, the effort to remedy perceived defects, to improve
conditions, would no longer exist since experimentation with the
identical solutions, designed to the same end, would be available.
In short, controlled inconsistency that promised useful results would
replace uncontrolled inconsistency, which frequently has little to
offer.
The fact that inconsistency with the national rules will not carry
with it an automatic veto of an effort to improve, only a set of
conditions designed to optimize the potential, argues for a stricter
approach in defining inconsistency. Appropriate programs of court-
annexed arbitration, for example, would be allowed on an experi-
mental basis whether or not they were categorized as inconsistent;
yielding useful information that could benefit other courts and,
conceivably, the system as a whole.
5. Sunset Provisions
Two separate sunset provisions are required. First, experiments,
even when undertaken by local rule, must come to an end. The
label "experiment" is not another device for amending or ignoring
the national rules."0 1 Yet, fixing in advance a term appropriate
97 See supra text accompanying note 21.
98 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 537.
99 See id. at 554.
100 Professor Roberts would have Rule 83 "explicitly delineate those areas in which
local rulemaking is appropriate." Id.
101 After evaluating the data generated by an experiment or a series of experi-
ments, the Advisory Committee may recommend, and there may be duly "enacted"
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for all experiments is most difficult. The two years proposed in the
1983 draft amendment of Rule 83 is clearly inadequate.1 0 2 Pre-
testing, gathering, and then analyzing data, publishing, and thereaf-
ter, if all goes well, amending the national rules will, almost
inevitably, take longer.
It would be desirable to fix a maximum period, perhaps five
years, for individual experiments. This might be done by resolution
of theJudicial Conference. The committee in charge of experimen-
tation would be authorized to fix shorter periods, perhaps subject
to extension.
There should also be a sunset provision for the project itself, the
statute authorizing experimentation by local rules. Sunset, of course,
does not imply inevitable termination. Congress may always take
legislative action, either to extend, to modify or to make permanent.
Termination is merely the price paid for inertia.
Fixing a suitable period for the statute itself to be in effect is
most difficult. We are not dealing with a single experiment in a
single district court, or a group of experiments all commenced at
about the same time. We are dealing with a process and one must
allow for start-up time. There should be a report on the experience
under the statute, and a minimum period of one year thereafter for
Congress to consider reauthorization.10 3 Tentatively, one might
suggest a ten-year sunset provision, with specific authority for on-
going experiments begun before the beginning of the tenth year to
continue.
CONCLUSION
The program suggested here is a modest one. It does not seek
to straight-jacket district courts, but rather to legitimate much of
what has in fact been going on, and to encourage still further
experimentation. There remains a great deal of room, and need,
for innovation. For example, we are reminded, with increasing
force in recent months, that asbestos cases as a class may need to be
treated differently than ordinary contract disputes for pleading
a provision for local option with respect to a particular procedure. This, too, is an
olition which eliminates the need for endless "experimentation."
102 See Walker, supra note 62, at 84.
103 Cf Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 906, 102 Stat. 4642, 4664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 651 note (1988)) (providing for
repeal of the arbitration portion of the Act five years after the date of enactment,
November 19, 1988).
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purposes as well as for discovery and scheduling. Shall we acknowl-
edge, openly and candidly, that this may be true of other classes of
cases?104
Our judges and the leaders of the bar are creative and innova-
tive. Above all, this proposal seeks to assure optimal use of the data
generated in the exciting laboratories of our district courts,
laboratories dedicated to the advancement of justice.
104 For a flavor of the current debate concerning the desirability of trans-substan-
tive rules of procedure see Carrington, MakingRules to Dispose ofManifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy ofNon-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedurm 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989) and authorities cited therein. See also CivilJustice Reform
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 102 (5)(A), 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (noting that "[t]he
Congress makes the following findings: .... (5) Evidence suggests that an effective
litigation management and cost and delay reduction program should incorporate
several interrelated principles, including-(A) the differential treatment of cases that
provides for individualized and specific management according to their needs,
complexity, duration, and probable litigation careers").
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